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SPECIAL JUSTIFICATIONS
SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT:
A THEORY OF
PRECEDENT. By Randy J. Kozel.1 Cambridge University
Press. 2017. PP. x + 180. $99.99 (hardcover), $34.99 (paper).
Randy J. Kozel2
INTRODUCTION
In Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent, I examine the
role of precedent in judicial decisionmaking. The book considers
the dynamics of precedential strength, meaning the showing that
needs to be made in order to rebut the presumption of deference
to precedent. It also addresses the contours of precedential scope,
which define the universe of propositions for which a precedent
stands as binding authority.3 In discussing both concepts, I try to
illustrate the ways in which the role of precedent is influenced by
broader perspectives on legal theory and interpretation. I also
offer some thoughts about how an institution like the U.S.
Supreme Court might pursue a consistent, unified doctrine of
stare decisis even as its members—past and present—adopt very
different interpretive philosophies.
The insightful contributions to this Symposium provide an
occasion to elaborate upon the book’s account of precedent,
especially as it relates to the necessary conditions for overruling a
flawed decision. The Supreme Court commonly considers
whether there is a “special justification” for departing from

1. Diane and M.O. Miller II Research Professor of Law and Associate Dean for
Faculty Development, Notre Dame Law School.
2. For helpful comments and conversations, I am grateful to the participants in this
Symposium as well as Akhil Amar, Samuel Bray, Richard Garnett, and Jeffrey
Pojanowski.
3. For a concise and helpful introduction to debates over precedential scope, see
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public Meaning Approach, 33
CONST. COMMENT. 451, 458 (2018) (summarizing the “ratio decidendi view,” the “legally
salient facts account,” and the “predictive theory”).
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precedent.4 Yet there is considerable uncertainty about how the
idea of a special justification should be understood.
In this Response, I draw on the existing law of special
justifications and compare it with the revised approach I defend
in Settled Versus Right.5 That revised approach is designed to
separate the question of overruling from deeper disagreements
about legal interpretation. The hope is to establish stare decisis as
a unifying force that enhances the impersonality and continuity of
the Court and of the law, promoting values the Justices have
described as fundamental. The Response—again prompted by the
enlightening Symposium contributions—also steps back to
consider the process by which the law of precedent might undergo
changes of its own. And I close with some preliminary thoughts
about the implications of treating stare decisis as a step on the way
to somewhere else, an idea captured in different ways by various
contributors’ references to “provisional” law,6 “nonideal”
constitutional theory,7 and the search for answers that are “right
for now.”8
Before turning to these matters, I wish to express my
profound gratitude to the organizers of and participants in this
Symposium: Paul Horwitz, Corinna Barrett Lain, Allison Orr
Larsen, Kurt Lash, Jason Mazzone, Stephen Sachs, Frederick
Schauer, and Lawrence Solum. These are scholars for whom I
have the utmost admiration, and it is impossible to overstate how
honored I am by their willingness to take part. Their Reviews

4. E.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2486 (2018); Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015);
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014); Michigan v. Bay
Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.
99, 118 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 413 (2010); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 377 (2010)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring). The phrase often carries a citation to Arizona v. Rumsey, 467
U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (“Although adherence to precedent is not rigidly required in
constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special
justification.”). As noted below, the Court used the phrase “special reason” to convey a
similar idea in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
864 (1992).
5. Throughout this Response, I will focus primarily (though not exclusively) on the
Supreme Court’s treatment of its constitutional decisions.
6. Stephen E. Sachs, Precedent and the Semblance of Law, 33 CONST. COMMENT.
417, 419 (2018).
7. Solum, supra note 3, at 463.
8. Corinna Barrett Lain, Mostly Settled, But Right For Now, 33 CONST. COMMENT.
355, 371 (2018).
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illuminate numerous dimensions of precedent while opening up
promising avenues for future inquiry, and it is a privilege for me
to be along for the ride.
I. SPECIAL JUSTIFICATIONS IN EXISTING LAW
The Supreme Court frequently reminds us that overrulings
should not occur in the absence of a special justification. The
Court occasionally adds that such a justification means something
more than disagreement with a prior opinion. It made this point
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
stating that “a decision to overrule should rest on some special
reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly
decided.”9 As Justice Scalia wrote in a statutory case a few years
after Casey:
The doctrine of stare decisis protects the legitimate
expectations of those who live under the law, and, as Alexander
Hamilton observed, is one of the means by which exercise of
“an arbitrary discretion in the courts” is restrained. Who
ignores it must give reasons, and reasons that go beyond mere
demonstration that the overruled opinion was wrong
(otherwise the doctrine would be no doctrine at all).10

Like Justice Scalia’s discussion, the Court’s recent reminders that
an overruling requires more than disagreement have occurred
outside the constitutional context, though it has framed those
discussions in general terms.11
The Casey Court described its understanding of special
justifications as having been “repeated in our cases.”12 Yet its only
citations were to dissents,13 and Akhil Amar has disputed the
accuracy of the Court’s historical claim in light of major cases such
9. 505 U.S. at 864.
10. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961))
(citation omitted). For Justice Scalia, the qualifying reason in Hubbard was “the
demonstration, over time, that [the relevant precedent] has unacceptable consequences,
which can be judicially avoided (absent overruling) only by limiting [the precedent] in a
manner that is irrational or by importing exceptions with no basis in law.”).
11. E.g., Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2407 (“Before overturning a long-settled
precedent . . . we require ‘special justification,’ not just an argument that the precedent was
wrongly decided.”) (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)). For a
recent dissent (signed by four Justices) taking this position in a constitutional case, see
Justice Kagan’s opinion in Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2497.
12. 505 U.S. at 864.
13. See id.
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as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,14 in which
overrulings were “based simply on the belief that the prior case
was wrongly decided.”15 Beyond issues of historical lineage,
questions also remain as to what a special justification entails
under the modern doctrine of stare decisis.
In this Part, I examine two possible conceptions of special
justification under existing law. The first requires the showing of
some additional problem independent of disagreement with a
decision on the merits. The second, developed by Professor Amar,
defines the concept in a more negative sense: there is a special
justification for overruling so long as a flawed precedent has
neither commanded substantial reliance nor been effectively
ratified by the people through their widespread embrace.
A. SPECIAL JUSTIFICATION AS PRESENCE OF ADDITIONAL
PROBLEM
The Supreme Court’s discussions of stare decisis often
compare the present state of the world with the conditions that
existed when the relevant precedent issued. For example, the
Court might ask whether material facts have changed16 or whether
a decision has shown itself to be procedurally unworkable.17
Incorrect factual premises and procedural snags are
problems quite apart from the disagreement of today’s Justices
with the rationale of yesterday’s decision. Focusing on these types
of factors supports a vision of special justifications as requiring an
affirmative showing beyond disapproval of a decision on the
14.
15.

319 U.S. 624 (1943).
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 235 (2012). Professor Amar also cites several
other twentieth-century cases as illustrating the same point.
16. E.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 855; cf. Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124,
1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing “changes in technology and consumer
sophistication” as justifying the reconsideration of precedent); FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 259 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In my
view, [the relevant precedent] was wrong when it issued. Time, technological advances,
and the [Federal Communications] Commission’s untenable rulings in the cases now
before the Court show why [the precedent] bears reconsideration.”); FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 533 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[E]ven if this
Court’s disfavored treatment of broadcasters under the First Amendment could have been
justified at the time [when the relevant precedents issued], dramatic technological
advances have eviscerated the factual assumptions underlying those decisions.”).
17. E.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2481 n. 25 (2018) (stating that a precedent’s poor reasoning “is a reason to overrule
it”); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009).
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merits. Some additional criterion must be satisfied in order to
establish the prima facie case for disrupting settled law.
Yet the Supreme Court has not stopped there. It has also
treated a precedent’s flawed reasoning as relevant to the stare
decisis calculus.18 This presents a puzzle for the view of special
justifications as requiring an additional problem beyond
disagreement, because reasoning and disagreement are so closely
related. Saying that a decision is poorly reasoned would seem to
overlap to a significant extent with saying that it is incorrect.19 The
overlap is difficult to explain if disagreement with a precedent is
insufficient to overrule it. The question becomes how weak
reasoning can be a special justification in itself, as opposed to a
condition that triggers the stare decisis inquiry and starts the
search for some further problem such as a mistaken or outmoded
factual premise, a procedural flaw, and so on.
A potential response is found in the work of Caleb Nelson,
who provides a conceptual and historical defense of the practice
of singling out the most glaring judicial errors for special
treatment.20 Under this approach, a precedent is subject to
overruling if it is obviously wrong, but not if it is a close call. The
special justification is the presence of a clear error as compared
with a less egregious mistake.21 Mere disagreement with a
precedent is not enough to overrule it. But a decision that is
clearly erroneous contains its own basis for departure.
B. SPECIAL JUSTIFICATION AS ABSENCE OF COUNTERVAILING
CONSIDERATION
Professor Amar provides a different account of the Supreme
Court’s insistence on a special justification for overruling in
constitutional cases. He contends that, while past decisions are
properly given “a rebuttable presumption of correctness,” the
Court’s overruling practice throughout the twentieth century
supports the proposition that “absent certain special
countervailing considerations . . . today’s Court may properly

18. E.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363; Montejo, 556 U.S. at 792–93.
19. Cf. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 409 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (contending that the evaluation of a precedent’s reasoning is a “merits argument”).
20. See Caleb E. Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87
VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001).
21. See id. at 7.
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overrule yesterday’s case simply because today’s Court believes
the old case incorrectly interpreted the Constitution.”22
As for those countervailing considerations, they take two
forms. First, a decision that initially was erroneous “may in some
situations stand if the precedent is later championed not merely
by the Court, but also by the people.”23 The initial tension
between the decision and the Constitution is alleviated,
“consistent with the document’s emphasis on popular
sovereignty.”24 Second, the Justices should “give due weight to the
ways in which litigants who come before the Court may have
reasonably relied upon prior case law.”25 Reliance interests “limit
the Court’s ability to abruptly change course, even if persuaded
of past error.”26
Professor Amar’s theory harmonizes the Supreme Court’s
statements about special justifications with its apparent
willingness to overrule certain decisions based on disagreement
with their rationales. If we view the need for a special justification
as demanding not the presence of an additional problem but
rather the absence of a countervailing consideration, there is no
inconsistency in the Court’s statements of commitment to stare
decisis even while it treats disagreement with a prior decision as a
sufficient basis for departure. Such an understanding, Professor
Amar concludes, “puts precedent in its proper place” as
determined by the Constitution’s text and structure and as
informed by the Court’s historical practice.27
II. SPECIAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND SECOND-BEST
STARE DECISIS
The previous Part discussed two potential ways of
understanding the role of special justifications in existing law. In
this Part, I describe a third approach that is overtly prescriptive.
This approach, which is the one I develop in Settled Versus Right,
urges a revision meant to better promote values of impersonality
and continuity—values that are salient in the Supreme Court’s
discussions of precedent. I refer to this theory as second-best stare
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

AMAR, supra note 15, at 234–35.
Id. at 238.
Id.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id. at 241.
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decisis, a term meant to suggest that the rules of precedent must
respond to the challenges posed by our world of disagreement
over the proper ends and means of constitutional interpretation.
A. PRECEDENT AND IMPERSONALITY
Deferring to precedent underscores the importance of
impersonality and the nature of the Supreme Court as an
enduring institution. In 1986, the Court described stare decisis as
“the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely
change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible
fashion.”28 Stare decisis “permits society to presume that bedrock
principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of
individuals[.]”29 The aspiration is to “contribut[e] to the integrity
of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance
and in fact.”30 As Justice Stewart wrote in a dissent that the Court
would quote in Casey, “A basic change in the law upon a ground
no firmer than a change in our membership invites the popular
misconception that this institution is little different from the two
political branches of the Government.”31 Justice Harlan’s dissent
in Mapp v. Ohio, which Casey also cited, likewise rejects the idea
that “mere altered disposition, or subsequent membership on the
Court, is sufficient warrant for overturning a deliberately decided
rule of Constitutional law.”32
The doctrine of stare decisis is not only, or even mainly, about
appearances. As Professor Larsen notes, “What hangs in the
balance of the precedent debate is more than just an approval
rating for the Justices in a national poll.”33 It is the Court’s ability
to pursue the ideal of impersonality through its operations. Stare
decisis promotes “public faith in the judiciary as a source of
impersonal and reasoned judgments” by helping those judgments
to be genuinely impersonal and reasoned.34 That explains the
Court’s description of stare decisis as “a basic self-governing
28. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 265–66.
31. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see
also id. (“No misconception could do more lasting injury to this Court and to the system
of law which it is our abiding mission to serve.”).
32. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 677 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. Allison Orr Larsen, Supreme Court Norms of Impersonality, 33 CONST.
COMMENT. 373, 375 (2018).
34. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
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principle within the Judicial Branch.”35 More recently, the Court
added that stare decisis “is a foundation stone of the rule of law.”36
And Chief Justice Roberts made a similar point in his concurrence
in Citizens United v. FEC, which noted that the “greatest
purpose” of stare decisis is “to serve a constitutional ideal—the
rule of law.”37 Fidelity to precedent both ensures and
demonstrates that the Constitution binds judges and Justices just
as it does other citizens.38
The importance of impersonality is reinforced by examining
other practices of the Supreme Court, several of which Professor
Larsen draws together in her Review. Prominent among them is
the Justices’ practice of referring to prior decisions in terms of
what “We held,” a reminder of the Court’s identity as a
continuous institution.39 As Professor Larsen puts it, “Every time
a Justice writes the word ‘we’ instead of ‘I’ he is subtly enforcing—
to himself as well as to others—that the enterprise of Supreme
Court decision-making is a collective one.”40 Not every Supreme
Court custom works this way; as Professor Larsen recognizes, the
proliferation of separate opinions shifts the focus to individual
Justices, as do discussions of “self stare decisis” that emphasize
the substance of a particular Justice’s jurisprudence.41
Nevertheless, much of how the Court conducts itself is consistent
with a desire to highlight the institution over the individual. As
Chief Justice Roberts has stressed, every Justice “should be
worried about the Court acting as a Court and functioning as a
Court.”42

35.
36.
37.
38.

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014).
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 378 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 752 (1988) (“A general judicial adherence to constitutional
precedent supports a consensus about the rule of law, specifically the belief that all organs
of government, including the Court, are bound by the law.”); id. (“Even when the prior
judicial resolution seems plainly wrong to a majority of the present Court, adherence to
precedent can contribute to the important notion that the law is impersonal in character,
that the Court believes itself to be following a ‘law which binds [it] as well as the litigants.’”)
(quoting ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 50 (1976)).
39. References to “this Court” and “the Court” are also common.
40. Larsen, supra note 33, at 378; see also id. (noting that “when an opinion is
announced it is styled not as ‘the majority opinion’ but as ‘the opinion of the Court’”).
41. Id. at 381.
42. Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules, THE ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2007).
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A commitment to impersonality is itself a personal choice, as
Professor Horwitz explains.43 He considers why an individual
Justice might make that choice and concludes that the answer is
found in the “troika” of office, honor, and oath.44 Professor
Horwitz reminds us that each Justice “faces an indefeasible
obligation to reflect on what the judicial office and judicial duty
demand and to follow that vision faithfully.”45 Drawing on his
analysis, I might add that a Justice who concludes that
impersonality is the proper touchstone faces further questions
about how to put her commitment into practice. A Justice who is
committed to, say, bringing the law in line with the Constitution’s
original meaning can decide cases impersonally even if her
choices lead her to vote to overrule applicable precedents. But
fidelity to precedent is unique in promoting a particular kind of
impersonality, one that reduces institutional variability within the
Court notwithstanding the Justices’ disagreements about the
nature of constitutional interpretation. That is how the doctrine
of stare decisis can transform a group of impersonal Justices into
an impersonal Court.
B. PRECEDENT AND PLURALISM
One point I emphasize in Settled Versus Right is that if stare
decisis is to promote impersonality by serving as a bridge between
interpretive schools, debates over the role of precedent need to
be kept separate from disagreements about the merits of a
decision. When applications of stare decisis end up repackaging
disputes about constitutional interpretation, fidelity to precedent
loses its ability to draw together Justices with varying approaches
to the Constitution. A shared commitment to precedent no longer
carries the prospect of transcending interpretive and
methodological divides. The doctrine sacrifices its force as what
Professor Schauer calls a “second-best coordinating device for
achieving legal consistency against the background of
disagreements . . . .”46

43. Paul Horwitz, The Constitutional Marriage of Personality and Impersonality:
Office, Honor, and the Oath, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 343 (2018).
44. Id. at 347.
45. Id. at 352.
46. Frederick Schauer, On Treating Unlike Cases Alike, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 437,
441 (2018).
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In response to this concern, I offer a revised, second-best
doctrine of stare decisis. The premise of second-best stare decisis
is that some considerations that might be relevant to the durability
of precedent in a world of interpretive harmony should be
consciously disregarded in a world of interpretive pluralism, by
which I mean pervasive disagreement about constitutional theory
and methodology. The factors to be excluded are the ones that
present the greatest risk of getting tangled up with disputed
matters of interpretive philosophy. Stripped of those factors, the
revised doctrine revolves around considerations whose content
does not depend on the interpretive approach that a given Justice
adopts.
1. Facts and Procedure
I noted above that the Supreme Court has treated changed
facts as an adequate reason for reconsidering precedent. Secondbest stare decisis takes the same approach, given that the analysis
of factual changes can proceed independently of interpretive
philosophy.
A useful illustration comes from the Court’s recent decision
in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.47 At issue was the power of States
to impose tax-collection obligations on out-of-state sellers. The
Court had previously interpreted the Dormant Commerce Clause
as prohibiting States from imposing any such obligations on a
seller with no physical presence within its borders.48 But since the
last time the Court addressed the issue in 1992, a revolution had
occurred in Internet selling and consumer behavior. Returning to
the issue in 2018, the Court overruled its precedents and
eliminated the physical presence requirement.49
Whether or not one agrees with its result, Wayfair is a good
example of a situation where factual change warranted a fresh
look at precedent.50 It does not matter whether a Justice is an
originalist, a living constitutionalist, a pragmatist, or otherwise.
47. 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
48. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) (also finding such obligations to violate
the Due Process Clause).
49. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099.
50. See id. at 2096 (noting the Court previously “did not have before it the present
realities of the interstate marketplace”); id. at 2097 (adding that “Quill was wrong on its
own terms when it was decided in 1992”).
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Whatever her interpretive tendencies and constitutional theory,
she can acknowledge that the world of Internet retailing changed
markedly in the decades leading up to Wayfair. The implications
of that change might strike different Justices in different ways, but
the change itself is an adequate reason for asking whether it is
time to revisit the relevant precedent.
The same goes for issues of procedural workability.
Differences of opinion will continue to arise over whether certain
precedents are too cumbersome to retain, but procedural
workability ultimately rests on considerations that can be kept
separate from interpretive philosophy. Like the inquiry into
factual changes, the inquiry into procedural workability is suitable
for our second-best world of interpretive pluralism.
By recognizing these types of considerations as appropriate
bases for revisiting precedent, second-best stare decisis leaves
room for correcting or updating certain flawed decisions. As
Professor Lain notes, inquiring into factors such as a precedent’s
factual underpinnings “provides an important outlet for extralegal context to find expression in the law.”51 The point of stare
decisis is not to freeze judicial mistakes, but rather to make sure
that change happens for the right reasons.
2. Reasoning and Effects
Not every facet of the Supreme Court’s stare decisis doctrine
fares as well in a second-best world of interpretive pluralism.
Return to the question whether a precedent is poorly reasoned.
That inquiry tends to be bound up with reactions to a precedent
on the merits.52 If originalists treat precedents that are framed in
living constitutionalist terms as weakly reasoned and thus subject
to overruling, and if living constitutionalists take the same
approach toward originalist precedents, stare decisis loses the
ability to serve as a link between interpretive schools. In a
pluralistic legal culture, the perceived soundness of a precedent’s
51. Lain, supra note 8, at 369. Professor Lain also issues some important challenges
to second-best stare decisis, including in its definition of factual change. Those challenges
are offered within a broader approach that accepts the use of stare decisis to “minimize . . .
the discarding of precedent based on nothing more than a change in the majority Justices’
views.” See id. at 356.
52. Professor Monaghan adds that “[w]hether a precedent is seen as clearly wrong is
often a function of the judge’s self-confidence more than of any objective fact.” Monaghan,
supra note 38, at 762.
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reasoning accordingly should be kept out of the stare decisis
calculus.53
Second-best stare decisis takes a comparable approach to the
analysis of a precedent’s substantive effects. The examination of
substantive effects is related to the evaluation of reasoning, but
the two are distinct. A decision’s reasoning might be unsound
according to some theories because, for instance, it ignores the
Constitution’s original public meaning.54 But the effects of that
mistaken reasoning are a separate matter; they might include
implications for the balance of governmental powers or the liberty
of private persons.55
Some interpretive philosophies take the position that
substantive effects are irrelevant to the decision whether to
overrule. If a precedent’s reasoning is unsupportable, a precedent
is subject to overruling for that reason alone.56 But on other
theories, effects can matter, and not every judicial mistake is in
equal need of overruling.
A judge or constitutional lawyer who believes that a
precedent’s effects should play a role in the stare decisis analysis
must explain how the assessment of those effects is consistent with
her broader theory of interpretation.57 For example, Professor
Lash draws on his commitment to originalism, which is grounded
53. It is possible for today’s Justice to consider, irrespective of her own interpretive
methodology, whether the precedent under consideration is poorly reasoned in light of its
own (implicit or explicit) methodological premises. I have suggested that this sort of
inquiry creates difficulties, including by asking today’s Justice to draw upon an interpretive
philosophy that she may view as fundamentally flawed or illegitimate (pp. 119-121).
54. See generally Solum, supra note 3.
55. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 38, at 758 (“Even an ‘overriding conviction’ of prior
error is not enough; the precedent must have some palpable adverse consequences beyond
its existence.”) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6 (1941)).
56. Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5
AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (arguing that use of a precedent in constitutional cases is
permissible only if it is the result of an “honest, skilled effort that poses the right questions
and tries to solve them through the right methods”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 290 (2005)
(arguing that stare decisis undermines most theories of constitutional interpretation).
57. Professor Solum reasons that such an approach is inconsistent with originalism.
See Solum, supra note 3, at 462–63. My own thinking about originalism has been deeply
influenced by Professor Solum’s work, and I defer to him regarding the premises of
originalism. I simply note that for constitutional lawyers who believe that fidelity to
original meanings is compatible with deference to nonoriginalist precedents under certain
circumstances, there should be coherence between the justifications for one’s commitment
to originalism and the determination of which flawed precedents may survive (pp. 64-67).
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in considerations of popular sovereignty, to articulate a theory of
stare decisis that treats judicial mistakes as in more urgent need
of correction when they substantially interfere with the will of the
people.58 By comparison, if a Justice is unwilling to consider
factors such as moral implications in resolving constitutional
questions of first impression but is willing to consider such matters
in deciding whether to depart from precedent, there must be an
explanation of how her approach to precedent coheres with her
broader constitutional theory.59
The point is that for those who believe a precedent’s
substantive effects to be part of the overruling calculus, there
must be coherence between constitutional theory and the
determination of which effects are relevant. Yet the pursuit of
coherence creates challenges for the doctrine of stare decisis in a
world of interpretive pluralism. If the Justices disagree about
which effects of a precedent are legally relevant, and if those
disagreements track their respective views about interpretation
more generally, debates over stare decisis will tend to merge with
debates over constitutional theory and methodology. For those
who think one of the functions of stare decisis is to connect judges
across time, this convergence is problematic. Second-best stare
decisis responds by dispensing with the analysis of a precedent’s
substantive effects in most cases. Again, the goal is to refine the
doctrine to better pursue ideals of impersonality and continuity.
At the same time, the second-best theory recognizes an
exception. A Justice may perceive some precedents as not simply
ill-advised, but extraordinarily harmful. In those cases, it is
appropriate for the Justice to vote to overrule based on her own
philosophy of constitutional interpretation (pp. 121-124). This
exception cuts against institutional impersonality by allowing
individual theories to drive departures from precedent.
Nevertheless, it does so in a narrow band of cases, excluding such
considerations in the lion’s share. The structure of the inquiry also
prevents the universe of exceptions from expanding too much;
there are only so many times a Justice can credibly declare flawed
decisions to be extraordinary in the harms they create. And the
58. See generally Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare
Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2007).
59. Cf. AMAR, supra note 15, at 231 (“If the touchstone here is pure practicality, it is
hard to see why pure practicality cannot also be the touchstone for all issues of
constitutional interpretation across the board[.]”).
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nature of the exception encourages candid discussion about the
role of interpretive philosophy in informing the treatment of
precedent, clarifying the ways in which individual theories are
relevant and the ways in which they are not. As Professor Lain
puts it: “[B]y creating a safety valve in the doctrine for the Justices
to express their disagreement with precedent on the merits, and
by limiting the relevance of those disagreements to the ‘rare and
exceptional situations’ where the precedent is extraordinarily
harmful (as opposed to just flagrantly wrong),” second-best stare
decisis aims to “channel[] non-doctrinal policy preferences into a
forum where they can be debated directly.”60
***
It is worth pausing to note the substantial overlap between
second-best stare decisis and the existing law of precedent as
described in the previous Part. The second-best theory recognizes
that if a precedent rests on a factual premise that was mistaken
from the outset or has become untenable over time, there is a
special justification for overruling—though I suggest that the
conception of factual change in the Supreme Court’s caselaw has
sometimes been too broad (pp. 110-114). Second-best stare decisis
also contends that a precedent’s procedural unworkability is a
valid reason for reconsidering it. Further, the theory provides that
if a Justice views a precedent as extraordinarily harmful in its
substantive effects, that is another reason for voting to overrule.
And while second-best stare decisis maintains that deeming a
precedent’s reasoning to be clearly flawed is inadequate to
support an overruling, the theory does not go so far as to accord
deference to decisions that “undisputedly misconstrue clear
constitutional text,” for example by reading “two Senators” to
mean “five Senators.”61
Likewise, second-best stare decisis acknowledges the value
of adherence to precedent when the Constitution’s meaning is
unclear (pp. 165-169) and when the prior Court “did not err in
interpreting the Constitution, but merely chose a suboptimal set
60. Lain, supra note 8, at 367.
61. Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Structure, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 789,
821 (2018); see also p. 121 (noting that no deference is appropriate if “a Supreme Court
opinion . . . cross[ed] into the realm of illegitimacy, for instance because it was written by
a justice who expressly ignored the relevant enactments and ruled based on personal
affinity or a flip of the coin”).
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of implementing sub-rules that nonetheless fell within the range
of plausible implementations.”62 Finally, the theory holds that a
decision’s impact on reliance expectations can warrant its
preservation despite its flaws (pp. 116-118).
The central difference between second-best stare decisis and
the existing doctrine is the former’s exclusion of certain
considerations based on their entanglement with fundamental
interpretive debates. To enable precedent to serve as a bridge
between Justices within a system marked by interpretive
disagreement, second-best stare decisis makes certain
accommodations to establish the doctrine’s independence from
disputes over constitutional theory.
III. CHANGING THE LAW OF CHANGE
As Professor Sachs rightly observes, my theory of secondbest stare decisis is “openly revisionary, rather than merely trying
to capture our existing legal practice (including our practice of
precedent).”63 That holds true regardless of whether the Supreme
Court’s statements about special justifications are best
understood as requiring an additional problem beyond
disagreement on the merits, or rather the absence of a
countervailing consideration such as reasonable reliance.
In Settled Versus Right, I explain why a Justice might consider
adopting second-best stare decisis as a theory of precedent. I
devote less attention to the theory’s constitutional underpinnings,
for the simple reason that the lawfulness of stare decisis, even in
constitutional cases, is well established in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence.
But Professor Sachs raises an important point: He notes that
the doctrine that seemingly enjoys acceptance at the Supreme
Court is “the existing one,” without the revisions I suggest.64 A
question thus arises as to whether the second-best version I
defend would alter the lawfulness of the doctrine of stare decisis.
I do not think it would. Within constitutional bounds, to
which I will turn in a moment, I am inclined to view the doctrine
62. AMAR, supra note 15, at 234; cf. Nelson, supra note 20, at 5 (analyzing the role of
stare decisis within the realm of “indeterminacy of the external sources of law that courts
were supposed to apply”).
63. Sachs, supra note 6, at 418.
64. Id. at 424.
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of stare decisis as a set of common law rules.65 Those rules can
change from time to time.66 As for how such changes may occur,
one possibility is that they must be found in “prevailing
standards” rather than brought about intentionally by the
Supreme Court.67 But I remain sympathetic to the view that the
Court has the power to make intentional changes to the law of
precedent, at least if those changes are designed to allow the
doctrine to better achieve its objectives as the Court has described
them over the years. In other words, the revision of common law
rules of precedent should be informed by the goals of stare decisis
as the Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized them (p. 15).68
At the same time, the existing law of precedent should be
preserved in so far as it can facilitate the achievement of those
goals.69
There is another objection that warrants consideration. What
if I am giving too much import to the Justices’ statements in recent
decades about the connection between impersonality and
precedent? Perhaps the Justices’ statements misconstrue the
Court’s role in the constitutional order, which entails an
obligation to correct the mistakes of the past and ensure that
“judges are enforcing the people’s document, not their own

65. See Kozel, supra note 61, at 824. For treatments of the relationship between the
rules of stare decisis and the common law, see, for example, JOHN O. MCGINNIS &
MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 168–72 (2013),
and John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503,
505 (2000).
66. Cf. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding
Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 651 (1999) (“Whether or not one
accepts the notion that stare decisis inheres in the judicial power conferred in Article III,
the argument could certainly be made that the founding generation must have
contemplated that this common-law doctrine of judicial management did not foreclose
further development of the considerations that inform the decision whether to retain a
judicial precedent.”) (footnote omitted).
67. Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
68. I am also persuaded that the doctrine of stare decisis does not itself warrant stare
decisis effect. For an introduction to this argument, see pp. 171-173. This point may not
matter if, for example, one believes that the existing rules of stare decisis are procedurally
unworkable and that a special justification for overruling is therefore present. Cf. Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require
Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV.
1165, 1167 (2008) (describing the current doctrine as “embarrassingly unworkable”). But
we need not go so far in order to conclude that the Court has the power to revise the rules
of precedent in pursuing the objectives it has articulated for the doctrine of stare decisis.
69. I take a similar approach in suggesting certain revisions to the rules of
precedential scope (pp. 145-146).
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deviations.”70 It may be true, the argument goes, that the Justices
have been “far better at announcing the importance of precedent
than they have been in actually being constrained by it.”71 But it
is not the practice of stare decisis that should change; it is the
parlance, including the very idea that there is any problem with
personnel changes leading to overrulings by today’s Court.
By way of response, I would suggest that stare decisis coheres
with key features of the constitutional framework. Supreme Court
Justices are insulated from electoral and official oversight;
precedent furnishes a means of limiting their discretion. Supreme
Court Justices are charged with interpreting a document that is
specific in some respects but uncertain in others; precedent
furnishes a way of filling gaps and settling questions. The Supreme
Court is vested with a distinctive judicial power, distancing the
work of the Justices from that of their political peers. And the
Constitution does not leave the process of change exclusively to
the judiciary; Article V always remains available.72
I do not mean to overstate the case. While Supreme Court
Justices are protected from official and electoral control upon
reaching the bench, the Constitution entrusts their appointment
to the political branches. What is more, as Professor Amar notes,
the Constitution “explicitly and self-referentially obliges all
officials to swear oaths to itself, not to conceded
misinterpretations of it.”73
To my mind, the Constitution does not make plain its
intentions regarding the role of judicial precedent. The best we
can do is draw inferences, and not every constitutional feature
points in the same direction. On balance, the view that strikes me
as most consistent with the constitutional blueprint is one of
essential continuity in legal interpretation. That entails a
presumption of deference to prior decisions. But it does not
answer the further question of what is required in order to rebut
the presumption.74
Answering that latter question is the province of the common
law of precedent. And the process of common law development
is informed by the values the Supreme Court has described as
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

AMAR, supra note 15, at 238.
Schauer, supra note 46, at 440.
See Kozel, supra note 61, at 803–19.
AMAR, supra note 15, at 237.
See Kozel, supra note 61, at 827.
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important to the doctrine, which brings us back to the depictions
of continuity and impersonality as (sometimes) warranting the
toleration of judicial missteps, both to protect reliance
expectations and to cultivate a broader understanding of the
constitutional backdrop as basically stable. Sometimes it really is
most important to get the law right. But within the category of
cases that do not rest on mistaken factual premises, that have been
workable in procedural terms, that do not flatly contradict
unmistakable constitutional text, and that do not rise to the level
of extraordinary importance in their substantive effects, I suggest
that continuity ought to be preserved, and I view the role of the
Court within the constitutional framework as supporting that
understanding.
CONCLUSION: STARE DECISIS IN THE MEANTIME?
Second-best stare decisis is founded on compromise and
continuity, even in the face of reasonable grounds for charting a
new course. Its backdrop is the existence of fundamental
disagreements about the objectives and techniques of
constitutional adjudication.
It is possible for the backdrop to change. Someday the most
basic disputes about constitutional philosophy might be resolved.
There would still be differences of opinion from case to case, but
there would be general agreement about constitutional theory
and methodology. And that agreement might eventually become
so entrenched and well-accepted that a retreat would be difficult
to fathom. This would not necessarily mean the end of stare
decisis; even within a particular interpretive school, deference to
precedent can provide significant value by, among other things,
protecting reliance expectations and serving as a “mechanism[] of
institutional settlement.”75 But the unique challenges posed by
interpretive pluralism would fade away.
Even if one believes that various strands of American
constitutional theory eventually will converge, there is still the
question of what happens in the meantime. Stare decisis offers a
response. Professor Schauer connects precedent with the goal of
establishing “coherence or cohesiveness among various different

75.

Solum, supra note 3, at 464.
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particulars.”76 This is a laudable goal in any situation, but it is
especially important during times of interpretive disagreement. A
pluralistic legal culture can emphasize the individual over the
institution and challenge the notion of the Supreme Court—and
the law—as continuous and enduring. Stare decisis pushes back,
reaffirming that the Court is “in fact discovering and bound by
law.”77 The doctrine allows the Court to link its opinions together
despite their inevitable differences. By ascribing “likeness” to
disparate cases in this way, the Court creates a “community of
decisions and community of decision-makers.”78
We can juxtapose this conception of stare decisis as a unifying
force—a conception that carries special resonance during periods
of deep disagreement—against the “subprecedent” phenomenon
discussed by Professor Mazzone.79 Subprecedents, he contends,
are for one reason or another “more easily ignored and easier to
overturn” than other decisions.”80 Some subprecedents are
narrow by design, reflecting “efforts to minimize the significance
of judicial decisions, to limit their reach and power, and to curtail
the work they may do in future cases.”81 These decisions resist
precedential effect by seeking to stand outside the creation of a
generally applicable legal rule. Yet allowing too many one-offs
could put pressure on the idea of a coherent “community of
decisions.”82 The doctrine of stare decisis responds by treating
legal rules as continuous rather than episodic. That approach is
valuable in a world of interpretive pluralism that can call into
question the extent to which constitutional law transcends the
moment.
There is reason to be guardedly optimistic about the ability
of differently-minded Justices to rally around a commitment to
precedent even if they are unable to reach agreement about
constitutional theory. Justices across the philosophical and
methodological spectrum have written or signed onto opinions
recognizing the value of stare decisis, suggesting the plausibility

76.
(1986)).
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Schauer, supra note 46, at 447 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE
Id. at 452.
Id.
Jason Mazzone, Subprecedents, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 389 (2018).
Id. at 390.
See id. at 391.
Schauer, supra note 46, at 451 (footnote omitted).
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of a shared commitment at a general level.83 Equally significant is
what one gives up by accepting stare decisis. Fidelity to precedent
does not demand that a Justice abandon her commitment to
originalism, or living constitutionalism, or anything else in cases
of first impression. Instead, it asks her to mediate that
commitment in certain other cases by following precedent in the
absence of a special justification for overruling.84 The doctrine
makes the same request of adherents of every methodological
school. Everyone gives something up, and everyone gets
something in return. First and foremost is the contribution to the
Court’s status as an impersonal, enduring institution. Moreover,
by helping to entrench stare decisis as a decisionmaking norm, a
Justice increases the likelihood that the Court will defer to
precedents she supports even if her preferred mode of
interpretation falls out of favor.85 Of course, a meaningful
doctrine of stare decisis is not likely to be perfect from anyone’s
perspective. That, in a way, is the point.
Conceptualizing stare decisis as a doctrine of the meantime—
as Professor Sachs puts it, “as a provisional doctrine, supplying us
with stand-in answers when we’re unsure of the real ones”86—may
also affect its perceived legitimacy. For example, some
commentators have challenged the consistency of stare decisis
with originalism.87 Professor Solum raises the possibility, subject
to a fuller exploration of the Constitution’s original public
meaning, that a commitment to originalism may sometimes be
compatible with fidelity to flawed precedents, if “the prior
decision involved a good faith attempt to determine the original
meaning of the constitutional text.”88 Still, depending on how the
historical inquiry plays out, tension between stare decisis and
theories like originalism may remain.

83. For a sampling, see Part II.A, supra.
84. See Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Agreement, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 1711, 1711 (2013) (noting that stare decisis can “mediate intense disagreements
between justices about the fundamental nature of the Constitution”).
85. This argument runs parallel to Michael Gerhardt’s description of a “golden rule”
of precedent pursuant to which the Justices “generally know from experience, training,
and temperament they cannot be too disdainful of precedents or else they risk having other
justices show the same, or even more, disdain for their preferred precedents.” MICHAEL J.
GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 79 (2008).
86. Sachs, supra note 6, at 418–19.
87. See Lawson, supra note 56; Paulsen, supra note 56.
88. Solum, supra note 3, at 465.

8 - KOZEL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

SPECIAL JUSTIFICATIONS

10/6/18 10:58 AM

491

Some of the tension dissipates if we think of stare decisis as a
transitional doctrine. Consider Professor Solum’s argument that
even if a consensus in favor of originalism were to emerge at the
Supreme Court, gradual implementation might be appropriate
given the justifications for originalism itself.89 Deferring to
nonoriginalist decisions would become an application of
“nonideal” constitutional theory, in which stare decisis is not “the
first best option” but rather “an originalist second best.”90 We can
extrapolate from Professor Solum’s analysis and extend his
argument to other interpretive philosophies as well. Someday we
might put our fundamental constitutional disagreements to rest.
In the meantime, at least we have precedent.
Discussions about the virtues of competing constitutional
theories continue apace, and that is a good thing. Those
discussions, and the premises they reveal and refine, assist
everyone from judges to lawyers to academics in understanding
the contours and implications of constitutional law. Still, room
remains for stare decisis. The doctrine emphasizes continuity and
impersonality even as—especially as—the legal community
ponders the big questions of constitutional interpretation. We will
keep on disagreeing about constitutional theory for the
foreseeable future, but that should not prevent us from seeking
out doctrines and practices that are “right for now.”91 At base, that
is the aspiration of second-best stare decisis: to deliver on the
promise of impersonality and continuity even in the midst of
interpretive disputes.

89. See id. at 461.
90. Id. at 464; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J.
307, 309 (2008) (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999)).
91. Lain, supra note 8, at 371.

